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Abstract—Safety is an essential issue for processes that 
present high risk for human beings and environment. An 
acceptable level of risk is obtained both with actions on the 
process itself (risk reduction) and with the use of special safety 
systems that switch the process into safe mode when a fault or an 
abnormal operation mode happens. These safety systems are 
today based on digital devices that communicate through digital 
networks. The IEC 61508 series specifies the safety requirements 
of all the devices that are involved in a safety function, including 
the communication network. Also electrical generation and 
distribution systems are processes that may have a significant 
level of risk, so the criteria stated by the IEC 61508 applies. 
Starting from this consideration, the paper analyzes the safety 
requirement for the communication network and compare them 
with the services of the communication protocol IEC 61850 that 
represents the most used protocol for automation of electrical 
plants. The goal of this job is to demonstrate that, from the 
technical point of view, IEC 61850 can be used for implementing 
safety-related functions, even if a formal safety certification is 
still missing. 
Keywords—communication protocols, fieldbus, functional 
safety, IEC 61508, IEC 61850 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The automation system of an electrical generation or 
distribution system is today based on intelligent electronic 
devices (IED) connected through a digital network. Each 
intelligent device controls, protects, supervises, measures a 
section of the plant. In medium voltage switchgears we 
normally have an intelligent device per cubicle, in high voltage 
substations one or more per bay. 
All the status signals, interlocks, closing or tripping 
commands are transmitted through the communication 
network. Some general purpose protocols can be used for 
communicating with intelligent devices (e.g. Modbus RTU, 
Ethernet TCP/IP and others), but also specific protocols for 
electrical plants exist, like the series IEC 60870 and DNP3. All 
these protocols can be effectively used for the configuration 
and the interrogation of the IEDs, and support all the functions 
that are typical of a SCADA (Supervisory, Control, And Data 
Acquisition). On the other hand, none of these protocols 
supports real-time functions, so they cannot be used for 
commands or interlocks. The only protocol that supports all the 
functions required for the substation automation is the more 
recent IEC 61850. It has services both for SCADA and for real 
time functions. With the use of IEC 61850, protection logic, 
safety interlocks, commands from real time functions (e.g. 
load-shedding) are transmitted digitally. Fig. 1 shows a typical 
architecture of the automation system in a substation, with 
different protocols used for different functions: 
 IEC 61850 for real-time control 
 IEC 61870 for remote control  
 TCP/IP for remote maintenance 
 USB for local set-up and commissioning 
 
Fig. 1. Typical architecture for substation automation 
With a full-digital architecture, also the commands related 
to safety functions are transmitted through the communication 
protocol. In electrical plants most safety commands lead to the 
de-energization of a circuit or a machinery (e.g. the emergency 
stop of a motor, fire alarm, etc.). In some cases, the safety 
electrical command is related to a risk of the process and 
requires the energization of a circuit (e.g. starting a ventilation 
fan in a tunnel, starting an emergency generator, switching 
from one source to another, etc.). 
Fig. 2 shows an example of interaction between an 
emergency stop push button and the trip of one or more circuit 
breakers. When the button is pushed, the safety PLC receives 
the status through the safety fieldbus and sends a trip command 
to the station control unit on the IEC 61850 network. Then the 
trip command is sent on the IEC 61850 bus, normally via 
GOOSE message, to the IEDs that command the relevant 
circuit breakers. 
 The paper analyses the requirements of communication 
protocols when used for carrying out safety functions, with 
reference to the international standards series IEC 61508. The 
transmission mechanisms of IEC 61850 are then considered to 
check if it can be used for safety related functions. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Example of safety system interaction with IEC 61850 
II. FUNCTIONAL SAFETY CONCEPTS 
Safety is a concept dealing with the reduction of the risk of 
physical injury or of the damage to the people/environment 
health. The overall risk must be below the so-called acceptable 
risk. There are several concepts of safety, and this paper 
focuses on the functional safety, which involves the operation 
of the industrial processes or machineries. 
Functional safety [1] is a part of the overall safety, and it is 
based on the principle that a system or equipment operates 
correctly in response to its inputs. Functional safety cannot be 
determined without considering the system as a whole and the 
environment with which it interacts. 
A process or a machinery has an intrinsic level of risk. The 
risk is the probability of happening of a fault multiplied by the 
consequences of the fault, in terms of damages to people or to 
the environment. If the risk of a certain fault or malfunction is 
above the acceptable risk, it is necessary to introduce a safety 
related function to reduce it. Such a function has the role to 
intervene for avoiding the fault or for reducing the 
consequences of the fault; in other words, for reducing the risk 
below the level of acceptable risk. The safety related systems 
can be implemented using any technology, but there is the 
constraint to respect some requirement of integrity. This means 
that it is mandatory that any safety related system has an 
adequate integrity level for assuring the proper operation. 
Integrity is here intended as the probability that a specific 
function/system is properly working when requested. The 
required safety integrity level (SIL) of a safety function must 
be adequate to the risk of the process/machine malfunctioning. 
The higher the risk of a fault the higher the required SIL. 
Today, most safety related functions use electrical and/or 
electronic and/or programmable electronic (E/E/PE) 
technologies. E/E/PE safety functions are regulated by the IEC 
61508 series [2]. 
One of the concept within the IEC 61508 is the definition 
of safety function as the coordinated operation of some basic 
elements, like in Fig. 3: 
 Sensors, that are responsible for measuring or detecting 
the abnormal operation, 
 Analogic/digital conversion, if needed, 
 Logic solver, within one Programmable Logic 
Controller PLC, that may be programmable or not. It is 
responsible for implementing the safety logic according 
to the inputs coming from the sensors, 
 Analogic/digital conversion, if needed, 
 Actuators, that are responsible for acting on the process 
to drive the overall system in a safe condition. 
The concept and performance of SIL applies to the overall 
safety function, thus the Probability of Failure on Demand 
(PFD) of each component should be compliant to the 
requirements identified to achieve the requested PFD of the 
complete safety function. The IEC 61508 defines four level of 
SIL: from 1 to 4. The higher the SIL the lower the PFD for the 
safety function and the higher the reduction of the risk. Note 
that PFD is a value that indicates the probability of a system 
failing to respond to a demand. The average probability of a 
system failing to respond to a demand in a specified time 
interval is referred as PFDavg. 
 
Fig. 3. Example of a safety function 
TABLE I.  VALUES OF PFD ACCORDING TO THE SIL VALUE 
 
Safety concepts are applied both to the hardware and to the 
software related to safety functions. This means that also the 
software should comply with the required PFD. The software is 
both the firmware and the specific application software. This is 
an important aspect also for the operation and the connections 
between the components of the safety function. 
Traditionally, the connection between the field devices and 
the logic solver uses copper cables for transmitting ON/OFF or 
 4/20 mA signals. Today, with the wide use of digital 
communication networks there is the need of using digital 
communication protocols even for safety functions. 
A communication system contains a hardware part (cables 
and communication chips) and a firmware part, responsible for 
the definition of the telegram, the technique for accessing the 
medium, the mechanism for transmitting, and so on. For safety 
applications, it is necessary that also the communication 
protocol comply with integrity requirements. IEC 61508 allows 
the use of digital communication protocol for safety functions, 
but it requires that methods are implemented to detect 
transmission errors. In a quantitative way, IEC 61508 requires 
that the communication system use no more than the 1% of the 
budget PFD for the safety function (see Błąd! Nie można 
odnaleźć źródła odwołania.). 
 
Fig. 4. Safety communication as a part of safety function 
III. IEC 61850 BASICS 
IEC 61850 is an Ethernet based protocol typical of 
electrical automation systems. Its main goal is to exploit the 
ability of IEDs from different manufacturers to exchange 
information used for protection, control and monitoring of an 
electrical substation. The standard defines this feature as 
interoperability [5]. 
The IEC 61850 series consists of ten parts that specify all 
the various aspects of communication into details. Section 7 is 
the core of the standard’s innovative concepts. The standard 
defines all the devices and functions that exist in a substation, 
and it organizes them into a set of Logical Nodes. A LN has a 
four letters standardized name in which the first letter defines 
the class the LN belongs, i.e. protection, control or monitoring. 
LNs are the interface between the automation functions and the 
real world: the IED’s manufacturer, following its own 
engineering practices, implements the function while the 
structure of data and data exchange are standardized. 
Section 7.2 defines the information models and the 
information exchange service models (ACSI Abstract 
communication service interface). The information model 
consists on the definition of four elementary classes that can 
model any type of logic device [6]: 
 Server – it represents the visible behavior of the device 
from the outside. A server's role is to manage 
communication with the client and send information to 
the other servers, 
 Logical Device (LD) – it contains information managed 
and shared between different applications hosted in the 
same device. Homogeneous info are grouped into 
Logical Nodes, 
 Logical Node (LN) – it contains the elementary data 
necessary for implementing the function the logical 
node refers to (i.e. overcurrent protection, measuring, 
breaker command, etc.), 
 Data – it represents the value of interest with all the 
attributes that are used to describe it. 
The ACSI comprises also the information exchange models 
needed to operate on data, which are: 
 Data sets – used to group data, 
 Substitution – supports replacement of a process value 
by another value, 
 Setting group control block - permits to switch from 
one set of setting values to another one, 
 Report control block - describes the model used to 
exchange information between a LN and a client. 
Report generation can be triggered by a change of a 
process data value, 
 Control blocks for generic substation event (GSE) - 
describes the exchange of hard real-time information. It 
is used for information changing sporadically and it 
provides simultaneous delivery of the same message to 
multiple devices using multicast/broadcast frames. The 
principal information exchange model for time critical 
information like tripping function or interlocking is 
called Generic Object Oriented Substation Event 
(GOOSE), 
 Control blocks for transmission of sampled values - 
used by measuring devices to send fast and cyclically 
analog sampled values, 
 Control - describes the services that a client use to 
control an IED, 
 Time and time synchronization - provides the time 
base to the substation automation system, 
 File transfer - provides the exchange of large data. 
IV. REMEDIAL MEASURES TO DETECT ERRORS AND 
FAILURES OF A COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 
If used in a safety function, the communication system 
must implement specific measures to detect communication 
errors and failures [3]. This is mandatory in order to avoid that 
any error or fault compromises the proper operation of the 
safety function. 
While IEC 61508 does not restrict the use of 
communication technologies, IEC 61784-3 [3] focuses on the 
use of fieldbus based functional safety communication systems. 
When using IEC 61158 [4] based fieldbus structures without 
modifications in the definition of each communication layer, all 
the measures necessary to implement transmission of safety 
data in accordance with the requirements of IEC 61508 shall be 
supported by an additional “safety communication layer”. 
 Fig. 5 describes the so-called “black channel” approach. 
The communication protocol of the selected fieldbus is not 
affected by any additional safety service. All the safety 
functions are in an additional layer, the safety layer, which is 
above the 7th layer (application) of the protocol. The safety 
messages are embedded within the standard protocol. 
 
Fig. 5. Implementation of a safety layer over a standard fieldbus 
communication system 
The role of the safety profile or layer is to detect all the 
possible errors that may lead to the loss or the corruption of the 
packets. 
The safety data must satisfy the following requirements: 
 Trusted data, the safety data must be correct, 
 Correct receiver, the receiver of the data must be 
correct, 
 Just in time, the data must receive the destination at a 
proper time. 
The first step is to consider what are the possible errors in a 
digital communication system, as in IEC 61784: 
 Corruption: Messages may be corrupted due to errors 
within a bus participant, due to errors on the 
transmission medium, or due to message interference, 
 Unintended repetition: Due to an error, fault or 
interference, old not updated messages are repeated at 
an incorrect point in time, 
 Incorrect sequence: Due to an error, fault or 
interference, the predefined sequence (for example 
natural numbers, time references) associated with 
messages from a particular source is incorrect, 
 Loss: Due to an error, fault or interference, a message is 
not received or not acknowledged, 
 Unacceptable delay: Messages may be delayed beyond 
their permitted arrival time window, for example due to 
errors in the transmission medium, congested 
transmission lines, interference, or due to bus 
participants sending messages in such a manner that 
services are delayed or denied, 
 Insertion: Due to a fault or interference, a message is 
inserted that relates to an unexpected or unknown 
source entity, 
 Masquerade: Due to a fault or interference, a message 
is inserted that relates to an apparently valid source 
entity, so a safety relevant participant, which then treats 
it as safety relevant, may receive a non-safety relevant 
message, 
 Addressing: Due to a fault or interference, a safety 
relevant message is sent to the wrong safety relevant 
participant, which then treats reception as correct. 
Starting from the list of the possible errors in the 
communication system, the IEC 61784 defines the measures 
that can be implemented in the communication stack in order to 
detect the errors and to set the system into a safe condition. 
Proposed remedial measures are: 
 Sequence number: A sequence number is integrated 
into messages exchanged between message source and 
message sink, 
 Time stamp: In most cases the content of a message is 
only valid at a particular point in time. The time stamp 
may be a time, or time and date, included in a message 
by the sender, 
 Time expectation: During the transmission of a 
message, the message sink checks whether the delay 
between two consecutively received messages exceeds 
a predetermined value. In this case, an error has to be 
assumed, 
 Connection authentication: Messages may have a 
unique source and/or destination identifier that 
describes the logical address of the safety relevant 
participant, 
 Feedback message: The message sink returns a 
feedback message to the source to confirm reception of 
the original message. This feedback message has to be 
processed by the safety communication layers, 
 Data integrity assurance: The safety-related 
application process shall not trust the data integrity 
assurance methods if they are not designed from the 
point of view of functional safety. Therefore, redundant 
data is included in a message to permit data corruptions 
to be detected by redundancy checks, 
 Redundancy with cross checking: In safety-related 
fieldbus applications, the safety data may be sent twice, 
within one or two separate messages, using identical or 
different integrity measures, independent from the 
underlying fieldbus. In addition to this, the transmitted 
safety data is cross-checked for validity over the 
fieldbus or over a separate connection source/sink unit. 
If a difference is detected, an error shall have taken 
place during the transmission, in the processing unit of 
the source or the processing unit of the sink. 
In a safety communication profile errors must be detected 
and the methods for doing so are those described above. It is 
not mandatory to implement all the protection measures, since 
it is necessary to implement only the measures that can avoid 
all the possible errors. 
 IEC 61784-3 defines the correlation between the errors and 
the possible detection methods (Fig. 6). 
 
Fig. 6. Overview of the effectiveness of the various measures on the possible 
errors 
Even when the messages are arriving in a correct 
(deterministic) manner the safety data still may be corrupted. 
Thus data integrity assurance is a fundamental component of 
the safety communication layer to reach a required safety 
integrity level. Suitable hash functions like parity bits, cyclic 
redundancy check (CRC), message repetition, and similar 
forms of message redundancy shall be applied. 
Generally, the communication channel shall not use the 
same hash function the superimposed safety communication 
layer uses. The safety code shall be functionally independent 
from the transmission code. 
The residual error rate is calculated from the residual error 
probability of the superimposed (safety) data integrity 
assurance mechanism and the transmission rate of safety 
messages. The number of destination sinks has to be 
considered for this calculation. 
The value of admissible residual error is related to the SIL 
level of the safety function, like TABLE II. shows. 
TABLE II.  RELATIONSHIP OF RESIDUAL ERROR RATE TO SIL LEVEL 
 
V. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF IEC 61850’S 
COMMUNICATION SERVICES 
Protection and interlocking functions are the main 
applications that may require a functional safe communication 
system. These functions use the GOOSE model to exchange 
information. 
GOOSE is based on a publisher/subscriber mechanism, and 
it uses a multicast transmission of data. If the value of one or 
more data configured in the GOOSE application changes, one 
IED (the publisher) sends a message to a group of IEDs (the 
subscribers) simultaneously within a single GOOSE message. 
In addition to the data, a GOOSE frame contains a set of 
parameters that describe the message itself (see Fig. 7). 
 
Fig. 7. GOOSE service parameter mapping 
In particular, GOOSE messages implement a time stamp 
parameter that contains the time at which one value configured 
in the data set has changed. At the same time, the parameter 
“state number” is incremented. This parameter represents a 
counter that increments each time a value change is detected 
within the data set, and a GOOSE message has been sent. The 
frame contains also a sequence number that increment each 
time a GOOSE message is sent. Time stamp, state number and 
sequence number are remedial measures against unintended 
repetition, incorrect sequence, loss, unacceptable delay, 
insertion errors as defined in section IV. 
GOOSE data exchange allows the use of VLANs and 
priority tagging as defined in IEEE 802.1 Q. The use of 
VLANs permits defining the set of IEDs that shall receive the 
GOOSE message. This feature prevents a safety relevant 
information to be delivered to the wrong device and to cause 
unintended events or errors: it is a remedial measure against 
masquerade and addressing errors defined in [3]. 
The GOOSE message frame is terminated with a Frame 
Check Sequence. FCS field contains a number calculated from 
the data in the frame. The receiver calculates autonomously 
this number, and compares it with the number in the FCS field. 
If the numbers are different, the receiver knows that an error in 
the communication is occurred and it discards the corrupted 
frame. 
Furthermore, GOOSE messages use a specific scheme of 
re-transmission to achieve the appropriate level of reliability 
(Fig. 8). When an event occurs, the GOOSE server generates a 
SendGOOSEMessage request and the current data set values 
are encoded in a GOOSE message. The GOOSE message is 
transmitted immediately and then retransmitted with a variable 
time interval (T1, T2, T3) not defined by the standard and 
 gradually increasing the parameter “sequence number”. An 
effective scheme of retransmission is based on an exponential 
increment of the time between the frames. The time interval 
increments until it reaches the retransmission stable time T0 
defined in the configuration of the GOOSE application as Tmax. 
T0 can be shortened by the event ((T0) in Fig. 8). Each message 
in the retransmission sequence contains a timeAllowedToLive 
parameter that represents the time the receiver waits before the 
next retransmission. If the timeAllowedToLive expires, the 
receiver reports a communication problem, and the system 
should be switched in a safe mode. The retransmission 
mechanism explained can be used as a time expectation 
measure defined in section IV. 
 
Fig. 8. Transmission time for events 
VI. CONCLUSION 
All the safety buses existing today use the “black channel” 
approach to detect communication errors. IEC 61850 does not 
implement any form of safety communication channel (black 
channel) as required by IEC 61784-3. However, the analysis 
made in section V reveals that the standard natively 
implements a bunch of remedial measures to detect all the 
communication errors defined by IEC 61784 [3]. The problem 
is that the standard does not define what must be done when a 
communication error is detected. If the communication 
between two IEDs fails, the system has to switch in a safe 
condition. It is reasonable to think that, for electrical plants, the 
safe state is considered a circuit de-energized. A possible 
solution is to implement in the 61850 stack the functions 
energize-to-trip and de-energize-to-trip. Another possible 
solution is to configure the IED to switch the system in safe 
mode when a communication error is detected using the IED’s 
configuration tool. The two solutions present a significant 
difference considering a hypothetical safe certification process. 
Implementing functions in the 61850 stack means that the stack 
should be certified compliant to the IEC 61508 standard; on the 
other hand, if a configuration software is used to program one 
or more safety function in a device, the software itself should 
be certified.  
While this work focuses on IEC 61850 communication 
protocol, it is also important to remember that SIL’s concepts 
applies to all the hardware and the software that compose the 
safety system. This means that not only the communication 
protocol should be certified, but also all the IEDs and circuit 
breakers that compose the safety chain. 
Further analysis will be made on a typical safety function 
that uses IEC 61850 as communication protocol. This will be 
useful to understand if IEC 61850 can satisfy the requirement 
of IEC 61508 about the maximum use of 1% of the budget 
PFD for a typical safety function and to estimate what is the 
maximum possible Safety Integrity Level of a safety system 
that uses a communication network based on IEC 61850. 
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